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INSTITUTIONALIZED INEQUALITY: 
THE MIXED BLESSINGS OF FRAGMENTATION IN METROPOLITAN LOS ANGELES 
Gary J Miller 
Danielson has observed (1976 : 1) that "Nowhere in urban 
America is the heterogeneity encompassed by a metropolis repro-
duced in its local jurisdictions and neighborhoods. " Charles 
Tiebout offered an influential explanation for this phenomenon when 
he argued that citizens can "vote with their feet" for the kind of 
local government and governmental polioies they prefer (1956 ). 
Thus, when presented with a choice of local governments in a 
metropolitan area, the population will tend to sort itself out 
into homogeneous sub-groups based on their demands for local 
public goods. 
Tiebout made a normative as well as a positive argument 
regarding fragmentation. "Voting with your feet" can act as a 
way of matching each individual with the local public goods mix that 
is best for him or her. The creation of new muncipalities means 
that some individuals will be able to move to a local government 
that better matches their preferences, while those individuals 
who are unable to do so will certainly be no worse off, Thus, 
fragmented governmental structures "yield a solution for the level 
of expenditures for local public goods which reflects the preferences 
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of the population more adequately than they can be reflected at 
the national [or consolidated metropolitan] level." (Tiebout, 
1956 : 416 . )  
Los Angeles offers an opportunity to examine both the 
positive and normative arguments. During the period from 1950 to 
1970, the number of municipalities in Los Angeles County increased 
from 45 to 77. Most of the new cities were Lakewood Plan cities, 
which were able to offer minimal services through contracts with 
the county agencies, at little or no property tax cost due to reli-
ance on sales tax revenue, grants, and other sources of revenue. 
Those individuals in the Los Angeles area who preferred this type 
of government, for whatever reason, suddenly had the opportunity to 
signal their preferences by residential relocation. 
This paper offers evidence that during this period, there 
has been a clearly observable Tiebout-like sorting out of individuals 
into income and racial groups. This has been d ue to both 
the marked class and racial homogeneity of the new Lakewood Plan 
cities, and to the sorting out of individuals among the older cities. 
At the same time, this increased homogeneity within muni� 
cipalities has been accompanied by an increasing inequality in the 
distribution of a primary municipal resource - taxable property. In 
fact, in some of the increasingly low-income cities, the growth in 
taxable property per capita failed to keep pace with cost of living 
increases. The years 1950 to 1970 saw Los Angeles county become an 
example of a 
spatially d ifferentiated metropolis in which b1acks are 
separated from whites, the poor from the more affluent, 
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the d isadvantaged from economic and ed ucational opportunity, 
and local jurisd ictions with the greatest public need s from 
communities which possess the greatest share of the public 
resources. (Danielson, 1976 : 1.) 
Segregation of Income Classes by Municipality 
To what extent have the various income classes become 
increasingly sorted out and segregated by municipal boundaries? In 
order to answer this question, it is first necessary to develop a 
measure of homogeneity for income class that can be applied to the 
county's municipalities at d ifferent points in time. 
The county's population will be divided into three income 
classes, as equal in size as is possible given census categories for 
family income. In 1950, for instance, 3 5.5 percent of all the 
county's families had income less than $3 000, 3 3.9 percent had incomes 
greater than $4,500, leaving 3 0.6 percent between the two figures. 
These income figures will serve to divid e the three income classes 
for that year. 
If a city has a representative mix of income classes, then 
roughly one-third of its population will be in each income class. 
The probability that any two of its citizens will be in the same 
income class will be approximately one-third, the same as for the 
county as a whole. But as a city becomes more homogeneously com-
posed of one income class or another, the probability that any two 
of its citizens will be from the same income class will approach 
the limit of one. This proba� ility can be calculated as the sum 
of the squared proportions of each city's families in each income 
class.1 
4 
As Table 2 reveals, 25 of the 42 cities for which we have 
data were in 1950 virtually indistinguishable from the completely 
heterogeneous polar case, with a measure of homogeneity less than 
. 340. By 1970, these same cities had shifted markedly away from 
this extreme, with only nine cities left in this category, and more 
cities in every category of increasing homogeneity. Furthermore, 
only one of the 30 cities created in the intervening period was in 
the extremely heterogeneous category. The pattern of changing homo­
geneity is shown in Table 3: 
As one might imagine from the increased homogeneity within 
and diversity among municipalities, the distribution of poverty be-
came increasingly concentrated. In 1950, those families and unrelated 
individuals with incomes of less than $500 constituted 9.4 percent 
of the county's population. This poorest "tenth" of the population 
was relatively equally distributed. San Marino had the smallest 
percentage in this income class with 3. 8 percent. El Segundo had 
4.8 percent, and every other city had more than 5 percent of this 
income class. 
By 1970, many more cities had successfully waged their own 
wars on poverty. The proportion of the county's population classified 
City 
Huntington 
Park 
Maywood 
Manhattan 
Beach 
Torrance 
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Table 1 
Examples of Increasing Homogeneity: 1950 to 1970 
Year % Lower-Class % Middle-Class % Upper-Class Homogeneity 
1950 3 2.6 31.0 3 6 . 4 . 3 349 
1970 47.1 32.0 20. 9 • 36 79 
1950 3 1.2 34. 3 34. 5 .3 343 
1970 46 .0 3 4.6 19.4 .3 6 91 
1950 24. 7 32.8 42.5 .3496 
1970 15.3 30.0 54.7 .4122 
1950 27. 8 42.4 29. 1 . 3417 
1970 16.3 3 2.9 50.8 . 3926 
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Table 2 
Frequency Distribution of Homogeneity Scores 
.333-. 339 . 340-.349 .350-.36 9 . 370-. 379 .400+ Total 
1950 25 5 5 3 4 42 
1970 9 13 11 4 5 42 
(old cities) 
1970 
(cities 2 - - - 1 3 
with missing 
data in 1950) 
1970 1 9 12 1 7 30 
(new cities) 
1970 12 22 23 5 13 75 
(all cities) 
Table 3 
Income Class Homogeneity in 
Los Angeles Cities: 1950 and 1970 
·-
Heterogeneous 1970 Middle 
(Homogeneity less Lower Income Income 
than . 350) 
Alhambra Lynwood Bell 
Burbank Monrovia Compton 
El Monte Monterey Huntington 
Glendale Park Park 
Hetero- Hawthorne Pasadena Maywood 
geneous Hermosa Pomona San Fernando 
Beach Redondo Signal Hill 
Inglewood Beach 
Long Beach Santa Monici 
Los Angeles South Gate 
Lower Gardena 
Income La Verne 
Middle Azusa 
950 Income 
Montebello 
Upper San Gabriel 
Income 
No Data Avalon 
in 1950 Vernon 
Artesia Baldwin Park Irwinda_1_e 
New Bellflower Bell Gardens Norwalk 
Cities Carson Commerce La Puente 
Since Duarte Cudahy Paramount 
1950 Lawndale Hawaiian San Dimas 
Lomita Gardens Santa Fe 
Palmdale Springs 
Pico Rivera South El 
Rosemead Monte 
Temple City 
Source: Income data is from 1950 and 1970 censuses. 
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Upper Income 
Covina 
Culver City 
Glendora 
Manhattan 
Beach 
Sierra Madre 
Torrance 
Whittier 
Arcadia 
Beverly Hills 
El Segundo 
San Marino 
South Pasadena 
Palos Verdes 
Estates 
JJractbury 
Cerritps 
Downey 
Lakewood 
La Mirada 
Rolling Hills 
Rolling Hills 
Estates 
Walnut 
as having incomes below the poverty level was 10.7 percent. But 
nine of the older cities now had 5 percent less in this class with 
Beverly Hills having only 1.4 percent. In addition, seven of the 
newer cities had 5 percent or less poor populations. Of the com-
bined 16 cities with very few poor, seven were homogeneous high 
income cities, six were homogeneous middle-income cities, and three 
were heterogeneous cities, by the previous definition. 
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While some of the cities had come very close to eliminating 
poverty within their midst, other cities had very high concentrations 
of poverty - 13 percent or more. These cities were low-income, 
middle-income and heterogeneous cities along Los Angeles' south-
eastern boundary, and Los Angeles, 
Racial Segregation by Municipal Boundaries 
While income class segregation by municipal boundaries is 
a relatively new thing, municipal boundaries have served to separate 
the races in Los Angeles County since at least 1950. In that year, 
there were 183, 000 blacks in the metropolitan area's 45 cities. This 
represented 5.5 percent of the total population in those cities. 
Sixteen of the 45 cities were less than one-tenth of one percent 
black, and thirty-eight were less than one percent black. These 
thirty-eight cities represented almost one quarter of the area's 
urban population, but together they contained less than one percent 
of the 183,000 urban blacks. Long Beach, Beverly Hills, Santa Monica 
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Table 4 
Cities with Highest and Lowest Proportions of Poor in 1970 
% Individuals Largest Income Class 
in Poverty If Homogeneity > .350 
Beverly Hills 1.4 high- income 
Palos Verdes Estates 1. 7 high- income 
Rolling Hills Estates 2.2 high- income 
San Marino 2.9 high-income 
Cerritos 3.4 middle-income 
Rolling Hills 3.5 high- income 
La Mirada 3.6 middle-income 
Santa Fe Springs 3. 8 middle-income 
Torrance 4.1 middle-income 
Manhattan Beach 4.2 high- income 
Arcadia 4.4 high-income 
West Covina 4.5 middle-income 
Temple City 4.7 (heterogeneous) 
Lakewood 4.9 middle-income 
Maywood 13.05 low-income 
Los Angeles 13. 3 (heterogeneous) 
El Monte 13.4 middle- income 
Bell 13. 6 middle- income 
Huntington Park 14.0 low-income 
South El Monte 14.6 middle-income 
San Fernando 14.7 (heterogeneous) 
Compton 19. 1 low-income 
Cudahy 20.0 low-income 
Vernon 29.5 low- income 
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and Compton had between one and five percent black populations, 
while Monrovia (6 .5 percent) , Los Angeles (8.2 percent) and Pasa­
dean (8.4 percent) were the only cities with more than five percent 
black populations. Almost 88 percent of the area's blacks lived in 
the city of Los Angeles, although this city contained only 6 0  per­
cent of the county's urban population. 
Blacks contributed greatly to the population boom in Los 
Angeles County between 1950 and 1970. By 1970, the total population 
in Los Angeles cities had increased by 83 percent. The black popu­
lation had increased by almost 3 50 percent to 6 40, 000. The propor­
tion of blacks rose from 5.5 percent to 10.7 percent. 
While 3 2  new cities were created during this period, only 
two (Duarte and Carson) had more than 5 percent blacks, and only two 
more 
_
(La Puente and Palmdale) had more than one percent black popu­
lations. Thus, the Lakewood Plan and most of the cities that were 
created under it, were essentially white political movements. 
Overall, the black population was at least as concentrated 
in 1970 as in 1950. Compton had become the first majority black 
city with 71 percent black, and together Los Angeles and Compton 
represented almost the identical proportion of the area's blacks (87 
percent) that Los Angeles had contained in 1950 (88 percent) . 
More than this, however, fewer blacks, and more of the 
total population, lived in relatively segregated communities in 1970 
than they had twenty years previously. In 1950, 3 4. 6 percent of the 
total urban population lived in cities with less than 5 percent blacks. 
By 1970, despite the fact that the proportion of blacks in the 
county had almost doubled, 39 percent of the population lived in 
cities with less than 5 percent blacks. The proportion of blacks 
who lived in integrated (5 percent) cities had dropped from 6 .3 9  
percent to 2.23 percent. 
By ranking each city by its proportion of blacks, and 
aggregating the black population along this ranking, the Lorenz 
curve for the distribution of blacks can be obtained for 1950 and 
1970· The Lorenz curves further demonstrate that the metropolitan 
area was more racially. segregated by municipal boundaries in 1970 
than in 1950. 
A similar story can be told for the area's nonwhites. 
Once again, the nonwhites in general, like the blacks in particular, 
became less dispersed among the municipalities. In 196 0, Los 
Angeles had 50.3 percent of the county's urban whites, and 6 1.7 
percent of the area's nonwhites. In 1970, the city had 42.4 percent 
of the urban whites and 72.6 percent of the urban nonwhites. 
Municipal Inequality 
In a recent article, Hill (1974: 155) investigated 
municipal corporate boundaries as a form of institutionalized 
"social arrangements that generate and perpetuate intergenerational 
inequality in the distribution of scarce economic, political and 
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social resources.,,. Hill's primary means of pursuing research was 
multiple regression analysis of 127 metropolitan areas in 196 0. 
Because indicators of fiscal re.sources and fiscal capacity have 
various meanings in different states and metropolitan areas, he 
chose as his indicator of fiscal capacity the median family income 
of a municipality. He defended his choice by pointing out that all 
municipal resources must come ultimately from personal income. 
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While this is perhaps a useful first approximation of 
fiscal capacity, it is imperfect. While all taxes must ultimately 
be paid out of someone's income, it is not necessary for a munici­
pality's revenue to come from the income of that municipality's own 
population. In many Los Angeles cities, there is no property tax 
and no direct taxation link between the municipality's revenue and 
the local population's income. These cities may rely on the sales 
tax, which taxes the income of anyone who purchases items in the 
municipality, and of course there is no guarantee that the shopping 
population will be the same as the municipality's population. 
Indeed, much municipal rivalry is generated as neighboring munici­
palities attempt to become the regional trade centers. 
Another increasingly important source of revenue for 
municipalities is inter- governmental grants from county, state, 
and federal agencies. These grants, even more than sales tax 
revenue, are not drawn from local pocketbooks. 
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For the purposes of this study, an even more serious 
problem with the use of median family income as indicator of fiscal 
capacity is that it assumes the very relationship that is of central 
research interest. If for instance, low-income families happen to 
cluster together in commercial areas with a high public resource 
base, then much of the reason for normative concern about municipal 
inequality is obviated: poor families living in resource rich 
cities makes for a favorable pattern of redistribution. However, if 
this is not the general tendency, then the pattern of poor families 
living in resource poor cities raises serious questions about the 
efficacy of our current policies and institutions dealing with 
urban decay and social welfare. 
For these reasons, a more direct measure of fiscal 
capacity, separated from family income, will be used. In 1970, 
the most discretionary source of income for municipal governments, 
and the only form of taxation that applied only to the inhabitants 
of the municipality directly, was the property tax. If all the 
taxable property in the 77 cities were divided up evenly among 
the more than 6 million inhabitants, there would have been almost 
$26 80 worth of property per capita. However, as the following 
table shows, this property was not distributed evenly. 
In fact, it ranged from less than $1000 per person in some cities 
to almost $1 million per person in the small city of Vernon. In 
fact, Vernon, the smallest city in the county, had more taxable 
property than 6 3  of the larger cities in the county. 
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Those individuals in the property-poorest sixteen cities 
make up about 10 percent of the population. Yet they have only about 
4. 9 percent of the taxable property. The ind ivid uals in the 19
richest cities make up about 10 percent of the population, yet 
these cities have about 16 percent of the property. 
It is possible to make a Lorenz curve for the distribution 
of taxable property by ranking the cities from poorest to richest, 
then graphing the property sum against the population sum. A 
perfectly straight diagonal line would mean that each city had an 
equal share of the taxable property by population. However, each 
successive Lorenz curve is farther from the d iagonal. The distribution 
of taxable property has become progressively more unequal through time. 
Part of the reason for increased inequality in d istribution 
of taxable property between 1950 and 1970 is the creation of new 
cities. In a 1970 rank ordering of cities by property per capita, 
the 32 newer cities tend to be clustered at the top and bottom of 
the ranking. Most (6 0 percent) of the pre- war cities had 1970
properties per capita between $2000 and $4000. However, most ( over 
80 percent) of the post- war cities had 1970 property- rich categories. 
The property rich new cities were those cities that were either 
very commercial ( Industry, Irwindale, Santa Fe Springs, Cerritos, 
Palmdale) or very rich residential suburbs ( Rolling Hills, Rolling 
Hills Estates, Hidden Hills) . The very poor new cities were those 
that were neither very collllllercial nor inhabited by the very rich. 
Total 
Revenue 
Per 
Capita 
$350 
$300 
$15 
$10 
$ so 
Figure 1. 
Total Revenue Per Capita Generated by Alternative 
Tax Rates for Selected Cities: 1970 
(The dot d enotes actual tax rate) 
Beverly Hills 
.5 1.0 1.5 2. 0 
15 
2.5 
Tax Rate 
There are, of course, other sources of revenue, including 
most importantly, sales tax revenue and grants from state and 
federal agencies. These sources of revenue tend to be correlated 
with property per capita, however, and with each other.. The 
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result of this intercorrelation is that all other sources of revenue 
besides property tax also tend to be highly unequally distributed. 
For instance, Hidden Hills, a small residential suburb with no commer­
cial enterprises, obtained in 1970- 1971 only $18 per capita, while 
Los Angeles ranked 59th from the bottom with $118 per capita, and 
Vernon had the most again with over $20, 000 worth of other revenue 
per capita. There would have been approximately $110 per capita if 
all the sources of non- property tax revenue were distributed equally 
among the area's inhabitants. 
Now, what governmental inequality fundamentally means is 
that certain cities have to tax their citizens harder to achieve the 
same revenue. The following graphs illustrate this idea. Revenue 
per capita is shown on the y axis, and the tax rate on the left. 
Each line represents feasible combinations of tax rate and revenue 
per capita for each city, given that city's property valuation, 
other sources of revenue, and population. The y-intercept reveals 
the city's other revenue per capita, and the slope of each graph is 
interpretable as the municipality's property per capita. This form 
of presentation strikingly depicts the most important fact about 
governmental inequality. Many cities simply cannot achieve the 
revenue per capita of, for instance, Los Angeles, at a politically 
feasible tax rate. Or alternatively, a uniform tax effort would 
result in very different levels of revenue for different cities, 
as a result of both of the differences in property valuations and 
other forms of revenue. 
Residential Seg regation and the Distribution of Municipal Resources 
It is clear that municipal segregation based on income 
and race increased during the period from 1950 to 1970. It is also 
clear that there has been an increasing degree of inequality in 
the distribution of taxable property. However, I have not yet 
shown that there is any relationship between the two trends - -
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that poor, or blacks, or rich, or whites tend to live in those 
municipalities with the highest levels of taxable property per capita. 
A first examination of this problem can be made by 
looking at those cities that were identified earlier as being 
most homogeneously rich, middle-class, or poor. As the following 
table demonstrates, there does seem to be a defini.te relationship 
between property per capita and predominant income class for 
homogeneous cities, with almost all hi.gh-income and almost all 
low-i.ncome cities being rich and poor, respectively,  in taxable 
property. The major exceptions are Signal Hill and Commerce, 
low- income cities with very high levels of commercial activity. 
[ Table 5 goes about here. ] 
Homogeneous 
Low-Income 
Homogeneous 
Middle-Income 
Homogeneous 
Upper- Income 
I 
I 
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Table 5 
Taxable Property Per Capita for Homogeneous Cities: 1970 
(Homogeneity Score Greater Than . 35) 
Taxable Property Per Capita 
Less Than $1500 
Baldwin Park 
Bell 
Bell Gardens 
Compton 
Cudahy 
Hawaiian Gardens 
Maywood 
Norwalk 
La Puente 
$1500 - $2500 
Huntington Park 
San Fernando 
Paramount 
San Dimas 
Claremont 
Glendora 
Lakewood 
La Mirada 
Sierra Madre 
West Covina 
Whittier 
$2500+ 
Commerce 
Signal Hill 
Irwindale 
Santa Fe Springs 
South El Monte 
Arcadia 
Beverly Hills 
Bradbury 
Cerritos 
Covina 
Culver City 
Downey 
El Segunda 
Manhattan Beach 
Palos Verdes Estates 
Rolling Hills 
Rolling Hills Estates 
San Marino 
South Pasadena 
Torrance 
Walnut 
I 
Thus, while it has been argued that the poor may tend 
to live in property- rich commercial and industrial areas, creating 
a favorable implicit pattern of redistribution, this is not the 
pattern that emerges. Most of the low- income communities are not 
significantly blessed with commercial property. Furthermore, 
while over half of taxable property tends to be non- residential, 
there are enough commercial activities that are compatible with 
(if not drawn to) high-income residential areas, that more of the 
high-income cities than low-income cities have large amounts of 
commercial activity. For instance, Beverly Hills, El Segundo, 
Culver City and Covina all have significant amounts of retail 
activity, resulting in over $40 of sales tax revenue per capita, 
while only Commerce and Signal Hill in the low-income cities 
achieve such high levels of sales tax revenue. 
Furthermore, while resid ential property is a relatively 
small proportion of total property, it is sufficient in the case of 
Bradbury, Walnut, Palos Verdes Estates, Rolling Hills and Rolling 
Hills Estates to maintain a minimum level of services without the 
support of any commercial activity. While Baldwin Park and 
Cudahy, residential low- income cities, would get only $10 per 
capita in property tax revenue from a tax rate of $1.00 per hundred , 
Rolling Hills would get $66 per capita from an equal property 
tax rate, and with an equally tiny level of commercial activity. 
Thus, lack of a commercial property revenue base means different 
things in low- income and high-income residential cities. 
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Since the more homogeneous low-income and high-income 
cities tend to be property poor and property rich, respectively, 
what can a rich or poor individual expect to get out of the municipality 
he lives in? On the average, what amounts of taxable property are 
available to rich and poor individuals. An answer to this question 
can be found by calculating the expected value of property per capita 
for different groups of individuals, based on the municipal 
dispersion of those groups. This is done with the following formula: 
EV
i 
= E{ p
i
.V. ) 
j J J 
where p
ij 
is the probability of being in jurisdiction j if you are 
a member of income class i, Vj is the value of some resource such 
as taxable property per capita, and EVi is thus the expected value, 
or weighted mean, of taxable property available to a person of a cer-
tain income class. 
[Table 6 goes about here.] 
Table 6 
Expected Values for P roF erty Per Capita· 
For Different Population Groups: 1970 
White 
Black 
Lower Income Third 
Middle Income Third 
Upper Income Third 
Families with Incomes 
Greater than $50, 000 
$2770 
2540 
2710 
2710 
2840 
3470 
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Table 6 reveals the differences in expected 
value of property per capita for four different income 
groups and whites and blacks. As can be seen, the distributions 
of the lower and middle income groups are such that they 
can expect to live in munici.palities with virtually identical 
levels of property per capita. The upper income group, however, 
can expect more than a $100 of· taxable revenue more per capita. 
The very highest income sub-group can expect even much more 
taxable property per capita on the basis of its distribution 
among Los Angeles cities, averaging over $700 per capita more 
than the lower two thirds of the population. 
The difference between whites and blacks is equally 
notable. While whites can expect a level of taxable property 
per capita somewhere between the upper and middle income thirds, 
blacks can expect to receive a level of taxable property per 
capita that is over $150 lower than that received by the lower 
income third. 
The Mixed Benefits of Metropolitan Fragmentation 
During the period 1950 to 1970, municipal boundaries 
increasingly served to separate races and income classes in the 
Los Angeles area. The city of Los Angeles and some of its 
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larger, older suburbs remained heterogeneous, but with increasingly 
large concentrations of poor and blacks. The smaller and newer 
suburbs were overwhelmingly white, and tended to be identifiably 
homogeneous for some income class level. 
At the same time, taxable municipal property became more 
unequally distributed. This trend, combined with segregation of 
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income and racial groups, created a situation in which the poor, blacks, 
and middle class could expect to get less return for a given 
property tax rate. On the other hand, a large number of middle 
and upper class whites escaped the property tax burden altogether 
in the new homogeneous cities of the Lakewood Plan. In 1970, 
22 cities representing over $1. 6 billion worth of taxable property 
had no municipal property tax. At the modest tax rate of $1.00, 
this represented $16 million in potential municipal revenue. 
What does this brief historical overview tell us 
about the benefits of metropolitan fragmentation in Los Angeles 
County? It would seem to be unambiguously the case that the 
improved municipal choice set in Los Angeles County benef itted 
certain segments of the population. Those 875, 000 people who 
lived in the newly created cities under the Lakewood Plan (only 
1. 4% of whom were white) were able by and large to live in low crime 
areas, with few dilapidated neighborhoods, with little or no 
property tax, but with the opportunity to provide themselves with 
a pattern of expenditures that fit their particular brand of needs, 
and with the power to zone to exclude the kind of people who wouldn't 
fit in. 
Thus, for instance, we read of Bradbury, a city of 873 
people, with the third highest income per capita, little crime, 
one family of blacks, no low-income housing, no apartments, 
and no unemployment. Zoning practices include a minimum lot size 
of 20,000 square feet. There is one area of middle-class housing, 
with smaller lawns, that were worth only $50, 000 (in 1977) . 
The founding f athars were forced to include these in order 
to have enough residents to qualify for cityhood back in 1957. 
Even after all these years, one Bradbury founder, Wilbur 
Cathrup Pierce, dismisses this appendage as "awful" • 
(Los Angeles Times, 1977:11- 1 . ) 
One councilman in Bradbury said, "We all want Bradbury to stay 
just the way it is . . . A person that came and said they 
wanted to make a big change would be called a heretic and run out 
of town." 
Bish notes that the incorporation of the Lakewood Plan cities 
"served to prevent the imposition of political externalities by 
neighboring municipalities that wanted to acquire their relatively 
high tax bases for financing of public goods and services for 
their own citizens." (Bish, 1971: 89.) But some of the older 
cities as well as the Lakewood Plan cities benefitted from the 
general sorting out of individuals that occurred during the period 
from 1950 to 1970. The City of Arcadia, for instance, reduced its 
proportions of poor and black populations, achieved one of the 
lowest violent and property crime rates in the County, at the same 
time decreasing its property tax rate. Yet in real dollar terms, 
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the decreased property tax rate is yielding more property tax revenue 
per capita than in 1950, due to increased values of property per capita. 
[Table 7 goes about here. ) 
Table 7 
Profile of the City of Arcadia: 1950 - 1970 
Population 
% High- income 
families 
% Middle-income 
families 
% Low-income 
families 
% Poor 
% Black 
Income Homogeneity 
Robbery and aggravated 
assault/100, 000 pop. 
Property crime/ 
100, 000 pop. 
Taxable property per 
capita (based upon 1970 $) 
Property tax rate 
Property tax revenue/per 
capita (based upon 1970 $) 
Total revenue/per capita 
1950 
23, 06 6 
50.8 % 
23.6 % 
25.6 % 
8. 1 % 
. 21% 
.380 
MI 
MI 
$26 57 
$ 1.18 
$ 31.26 
$ 98.54 
25 
1970 
45 , 138 
50.1 % 
32.1 % 
17. 8 % 
4. 4 % 
. 07% 
.385 
16 0 
286 7 
$3296 
$ 1. 00 
$ 31. 48 
$ 116 . 50 
But while the Lakewood Plan cities were protecting 
their municipal resources, and while other cities were following 
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Arcad ia's pattern of increased homogeneity, d ecreased tax rates, and 
increased property tax yield , other cities were getting 
increasing concentrations of poor and d iscriminated minorities. 
The city of Los Angeles, for lnstance, had markedly increased 
populations of low-income cltlzens and blacks. The numbers of 
robbery and aggravated assault arrests jumped from 250 to 
1, 037 per hundred thousand from 1950 to 1970. Yet, the 
resources to d eal with the problems of urban poverty and crime 
were not accelerating at an equal rate. Between the 1967 and 
1972 Censuses of Manufacturing, the number of employees in the 
city's manufacturing firms actually d ecreased in the areas of 
food and paper prod ucts, printing, and machinery manufacturing. 
Over-all the number of manufacturing employees d ecreased from 
309, 600 to 281, 200. In constant 1967 d ollars, the value-ad d ed 
by manufacturing establishments in the City of Los Angeles d ecreased 
from $4, 260 million to $3843 million, a d ecrease of almost 10%. 
This eroslon of the city's resource base shows up in 
the city's budget. The property tax rate lncreased from 1. 85 
to 2.52 per hund red , but the total revenue per capita d ecreased 
from $226 (irt real 1970 d ollars) to $181. 5. There was $242 
of d ebt in 1950 (1970 d ollars) for every individual in the city of 
Los Angeles. By 1970, this figure had almost d oubled to $490. 
[Table 8 goes about here. ] 
Table 8 
Profile of the City of Los Angeles: 1950 - 1970 
Populatlon 
% High-income families 
% Mid d le-lncome families 
% Low-income families 
% Poor 
% Black 
Income homogeneity 
Robbery and aggravated 
assault/100, 000 pop. 
Property crime/ 
100, 000 pop. 
Taxable property per 
capita (based upon 1970 $) 
Property tax rate 
Property tax revenue/ per 
capita (based upon 1970 $) 
Total revenue/per capita 
(based upon 1970 $) 
1950 
l, 970, 358 
33. 7 % 
28.5 % 
37. 7 % 
10. 7 % 
8.2 % 
.3373 
250 
1388 
$2039 
$ 1. 85 
$ 36 .39 
$ 226 .16 
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1970 
2, 81l,801 
34.9 % 
29.8 % 
35. 3 % 
13.3 % 
17.9 % 
. 3354 
1037 
5154 
$2500 
$ 2.52 
$ 6 3.24 
$ 181. 50 
Compton and Huntington Park have become predominantly 
low-income cities in the period since 1950. Compton has become 
a majority black city, while Huntington Park has maintained its 
primarily white make-up. Crime rates have reach higher proportions 
in Compton than in any other city in the county, and property 
per capita has barely kept rate with inflation. In Huntington 
Park, property per capita has actually failed to keep pace with 
inflation. The municipal property tax rates have been increased 
in both cities, but in Huntington Park, the return in property 
revenue per capita has decreased in constant dollar terms. 
[ Tables 9 and 10 go about here.] 
For these low-income cities, the factors that must be 
included in any analysis of the benefits of fragmentation is the 
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distribution of resources. While fragmentation may promote multiple, 
responsive, small-scale demand- revealing mechanisms for homogeneous 
neighborhoods, it may also result in increased income and racial 
segregation. And if income and racial segregation is empirically 
associated with either the concentration of resources, or the 
concentration of resource-draining problems like crime, then 
fragmentation may actually decrease the welfare of the individuals 
in the low- income and minority jurisdictions, contrary to the 
original Tiebout expectation. 
Conclusion 
Several authors have picked up on Tiebout's theme that 
everyone can be better off in a fragmented institutional framework. 
Wallace Oates, for instance, says that dividing the population of a 
Table 9 
Profile of the City of Compton: 1950 - 1970 
Population 
% High-income families 
% Middle- income families 
% Low- income families 
% Poor 
% Black 
Income homogeneity 
Robbery and aggravated 
assault/100,QOO pop. 
Property crime/ 
100,000 pop. 
Taxable property per 
capita (based upon 1970 $) 
Property tax rate 
Property tax revenue per 
capita (based upon 1970 $) 
Total revenue per 
capita (based upon 1970 $) 
1950 
47 ,991 
33.0 % 
38.0 % 
29.0 % 
5. 7 % 
19.1 % 
.338 
92 
116 7  
$1322 
$ 1.4.4 
$ 18.93 
$ 6 3.37 
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1970 
78,547 
20.0 % 
36 . 3  % 
43. 7 % 
19.1 % 
71.0 % 
.36 3 
2405 
10, 710 
$1428 
$ 1.59 
$ 22. 04 
$ 108.93 
Table 10 
Profile of the City of Huntington Park: 1950 - 1970 
Population 
% High-income families 
% Middle- income families 
% Low- income families 
% Poor 
% Black 
Income homogeneity 
Robbery and aggravated 
assault/100,000 pop. 
Property crime/ 
100,000 pop. 
Taxable property per 
capita (based upon 1970 $) 
Property tax rate 
Property tax revenue/per 
capita (based upon 1970 $) 
Total revenue/per 
capita (based upon 1970 $) 
1950 
47,991 
36 .4 % 
31.0 % 
32.6 % 
6 .6 % 
.03 % 
.335 
95 
1320 
2543 
$ .96 
$25.00 
$98.53 
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1970 
78,547 
14.7 % 
37.2 % 
47.1 % 
14.0 % 
• 19 % 
.36 8 
1019 
496 1 
2113 
$ 1. 05 
$ 22. 00 
$121. 38 
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metropolitan area into local groups, and providing the Pareto 
efficient level of public good consumption in each unit, clearly 
cannot hurt any one. But it can make some individuals better off 
by reducing the discrepancy between their preferred levels of public 
goods consumption and that which they actually receive. Thus, 
we can clearly make at least one person better off, without 
reducing the welfare of anyone else, by moving to separate 
groups. Therefore, in the absence of cost-savings from 
increasing the size of the group of consumers, it is always 
preferable to provide Pareto- efficient levels of consumption 
for subsets of a group than for the group as a whole. (1972:58) • 
In Los Angeles County from 1950 to 1970, the metropolitan 
area became less consolidated and more fragmented. It simultaneously 
became an area in which municipalities were more homogeneous. 
Oates is right in saying that this kind of sltuatJon is one in 
which fewer and fewer people had to bear large "conformity costs" 
associated with living in a jurisdiction whose actions were far from 
their own preferences. Yet surely any complete analysis would 
look, not only at the effects of fragmentation on the responsiveness 
of the jurisdictions' to individual preferences, but the capacity of 
the jurisdictional governments to respond. It wouldn't help 
identical low-income individuals to congregate in a jurisdiction 
where conformity costs were zero, but where the crime rates were 
high and the resources of the government to deal with those problems 
were non- existent. 
The increasing homogeneity in Los Angeles County resulted 
in a decreased basis for redistribution within each municipality. 
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It is not clear whether the motivation for increased fragmentation 
and homogeneity was to escape "conformity costs" or to escape the 
redistributional burden of living in a municipality with a broad 
mix of income classes. It is also not clear that everyone is better 
off because of the reduced conformity costs. In another paper 
(Miller, 1977) I show that the low-income individual may be worse 
off with no conformity costs in a homogeneous, but bankrupt 
jurisdiction. 
This being the case, the Los Angeles experience suggests 
several caveats for Tiebout's normative argument. Because the 
sorting out of individuals into different municipalities is largely 
on the basis of income and race, and because concentrations of poor 
and minorities seem to be associated with such negative externalities 
as higher crime rates and declining public resource bases, a 
structure of jurisdictional fragmentation and choice is not 
advantateous for everyone. Indeed, some of the increasingly 
homogeneous low-income communities of Los Angeles became relatively 
and absolutely more disadvantaged during the period of racial and 
income differentiation. 
It appears that the problem of metropolitan organization 
is incorrectly posed in the literature as a question of economic 
efficiency. If the benefits of fragmentation fall primarily on 
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homogeneous white middle and upper- class suburbs, then the question 
of economic efficiency must be replaced by the essentially political 
questions of distribution of benefits and mobilization of bias. 
Who shall (and should) be helped, and who harmed by the structure of 
local government in a metropolitan area? Who should get more and 
who less? 
FOOTNOTES 
1. This measure of homogeneity was suggested by Rae's 
fractionalization measure. See Rae, 1971:56 . 
2. In defining class homogeneity for Los Angeles County 
municipalities, family income was used for 1970 and for 
1950 cities larger than 10, 000. This data was not available 
for smaller 1950 cities, so homogeneity was calculated using 
families and unrelated individuals. The three income class 
definitions and their respective proportions in the county 
as a whole were as follows: 
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Lower 
Income 
1970 less than 
(75 cities) $8, 000 
(31. 6 % )  
1950 less than 
(33 cities $3, 000 
with pop. (35. 5% ) 
greater than 
10,000) 
1950 less than 
(9 cities with $2, 000 
pop. between (31. 7% ) 
2, 500 and 10, 000) 
35 
Middle Upper County 
Income Income Homogeneity 
$8000 to more than . 334 
$13,750 $13, 750 
(32. 4%)  (36 .  0% ) 
$3, 000 more than 
• 335 
$4, 500 $4, 500 
(33.9% ) (30.6 % )  
$2, 000 to more than .334 
$4, 000 $4, 000 
(34. 7% ) (33. 6 % ) 
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